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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Threat to Burma

1. During the past few months, there has been increasing evidence that the Chinese Communists have begun to intervene in Burmese affairs by providing aid and guidance from across the border to the insurgent Burma Communist Party and by assisting other groups opposing the government through the Chinese Communist Embassy in Rangoon.
2. A number of reliable reports during the past three months indicate that the Chinese Communists have come to an agreement with the Burmese Communist Party regarding assistance to the latter. The substance of these reports is as follows: (a) Chu Chia-pi, a prominent Chinese Communist guerrilla leader has been detailed as Chief of Staff of the 14th Army in Yunnan, and has been assigned responsibility for planning and directing a guerrilla campaign in north Burma, using disguised Chinese troops if necessary; (b) armed units of the Burmese Communist Party have been moving northward toward the Chinese border to receive Chinese materiel and prepare for a "general offensive"; (c) the Chinese Communists are conducting an extensive program of training and equipping Burmese personnel in Yunnan; (d) Chinese Communist army officers are "advising" Burmese Communists.
3. A number of reported Chinese Communist actions, taken independently of the Burmese Communists, which suggest growing Chinese interest in Burma include: (a) promotion of an "autonomous" Kachin state in territory adjacent to Burma which, if established, might stimulate a separatist movement among Burma Kachins; (b) forays into Burmese territory by Chinese forces along Burma's ill-defined northeast border (evidence is lacking to determine if the objective of these incursions was to engage Burmese forces); (c) stockpiling of food and deployment along the Sino-Burma border of an additional 10,000 troops, presumably drawn from the aforementioned 14th Army (while a force of 10,000 troops is not sufficient to conquer Burma, it is adequate to support indefinitely an extensive guerrilla campaign in north Burma, as well as to contain refugee Nationalist forces in Burma); and (d) attempts of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Rangoon to establish control over the local Chinese community and the development of close liaison between this embassy and the strongly pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP). Apart from the activities of the Chinese, Communist capabilities for undertaking political intrigue under diplomatic cover have been enhanced by the establishment, on 16 April 1951, of a Soviet Embassy and the previous arrival in Indochina of additional representatives of the Ho Chi Minh regime, who have been accorded semi-official status.
4. Purportedly reflecting Chinese direction, the Burmese Communist Party has abandoned its strictly independent campaign to achieve the mili-

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tary defeat of the government and now is advocating a united front of all insurgents. Further indications of Chinese Communist influence are reports of attempts on the part of the Burmese Communists to enlarge and strengthen their organization by widening their ranks to include several heretofore separate pro-Communist parties. (Previously it was reported that the Chinese had insisted upon the amalgamation of the several pro-Communist groups before committing themselves to a definite program of substantial aid.)

5. Burma's controls along its ill-defined border with China are inadequate to prevent large-scale illegal immigration, much more to prevent the infiltration of Communist agents or incursions by Chinese forces. Government forces are heavily engaged against insurgents in lower Burma and few, if any, reinforcements can be made available for duty in the rugged border region. Consequently, most of Burma north of Mandalay is vulnerable to Communist operations. Furthermore, the Burmese Government's fear of Communist China and its continued refusal clearly to identify expansionist International Communism with local insurgency are forestalling the adoption of measures designed to check the growing Communist threat.

6. A pattern of Communist activity in Burma is becoming apparent. Until recent months, the Communist movement was drifting more or less aimlessly and was badly in need of coordination and revitalization. Now, however, attempts are apparently being made to draw together the disgruntled elements in Burma, a definite strategy for the ultimate overthrow of the Burmese Government is evident and Communism in Burma is clearly to receive aid and possibly leadership from Communist China. This strategy may envision the establishment of a "liberated area" in north Burma, from which a political and military offensive against the rest of Burma could be launched.

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